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Abstract: Image right is maintained by comparing the outward appearance of
pictures, not their meaning. But images are made to make people watch them.
Logos are a clear example: people must watch these images, and must answer
to their persuasive force. With the right to protect an image from copying, the
copyright, comes, therefore a duty to watch. But a duty to watch goes against
our freedom of perception. It is unclear how the law protects that freedom. Rob
Scholte’s works address such issues by making art of pre-existing images.
I. IMAGE RIGHT
Dutch artist, Rob Scholte, admitted his irritations about television. Watching
television seems to him synonymous with watching famous personalities—
famous, mostly, for being on television so often. In gossip magazines we
witness how an industry of novelties is built on episodes from their lives. It
was clear to me what Scholte was complaining about: we are coerced into
seeing these people as well as into developing an interest in them. I also
understood why the issue of image right kept him busy in his works; the
image right appealed to by artists, advertisers, branding and logo-makers to
protect their work. What exactly does it protect and how is it connected to
the media’s empty-headed self-advertising?
With image rights, we allow makers of representations (pictorial symbols
of all sorts) to prevent others from reproducing and publishing them. Image
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rights regulate the secondary use of depictions. ‘Image right’ is standardly
treated as a subcategory of copyright, which more nearly seems to aim at the
process of writing, which is rather about picking the words for reasons of the
way you think through your subject matter, than about the way you write the
letters on the paper. But I think this priority should be reversed. Scientific
knowledge accumulates, and repeating others’ insights contributes to that
development—as long as the repeated text is not word-for-word identical and
presented as one’s own.1 Copyright infringement concerns the way an insight’s
formulation is copied, not the insight itself: the ideas are free-floating. But
what belongs to the form, what to the contents?
Figure 1: Rob Scholte, Self Portrait
A few years ago, a student submitted two papers he had taken from the
internet, integrally, solely replacing the typical jargon with synonyms. Did
he remain within the lines of copyright law—as one could argue because he
may not have taken the ideas, but, allegedly, the form? Well, he certainly
missed the goal of education, which is to think out an argument on your own.
His intention was clearly to not do the work his professor was asking him to
do. Interestingly, we currently establish a student’s writing integrity through
digital analysis, and plagiarism software is not interested in the meaning of
the words in the sentences, but in the sequence of the majority of them. All
words belong to the surface of the text, its image. The software singles out
the words humans deem unimportant as much as the jargon. The student
had copied 92% of all the words in these two texts. Even if he had replaced
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all jargon words by meaningless and irrelevant terms, such as “soldier”, “ball”
and “squirrel”, and his text would have become completely unintelligible, he
would have been guilty plagiarising. So copyright law is a kind of image right,
rather than image right a kind of copyright.
II. MEDIUM AND MEANING
Pierre Menard would not have gotten away with the passages of the Don Qui-
chot that he wrote, even though he did not copy them from Cervantes’ work,
or even write them putting himself in Cervantes’ shoes; he wrote the passages
struggling from the facts of his own life and time, or so Borges reports it.2 The
morale of Borges’ story is instructive for my argument here. Near the end of
the story, Borges compares two passages, one from Cervantes, the other from
Menard, word for word identical to each other, and shows the vast difference
in meaning of the texts. In terms that I develop in the second part of this
essay, Menard has brought an existing text to life—which is, I think, what art
is for.3 The life instilled in a work is due to the maker’s achievement. Borges
would disagree with the assessment that Menard plagiarised Cervantes, and
so do I.
The Pierre Menard-case differs profoundly from mere appropriationism,
such as Sherrie Levine’s ‘After Walker Evans’ serie, 1981, which could best
be understood as a philosophical move in art, or, perhaps, as conceptual
art. Levine photographed Walker Evans’ photos, and exhibited her photos as
‘After Walker Evans #. . . ’ How is that adding much? Is a photo of a photo
not just the next print or copy of it? Should we distinguish appropriation of
famous works which still stand on their own, and are, so to speak, advertised
by the appropriation; and appropriation of works perhaps forgotten, that
are reanimated by the appropriation? In this paper I am merely arguing
that the aesthetic values proper to art criticism should have a stake in cases
such as these. Appropriationists may have taught us that even two identical
copies can have different meanings; the achievement in the appropriationist
gesture is of a rather meagre kind, as well as parasitic on another maker’s
achievement, and unavailable aesthetically.4
But the difference between two objects realised in different art forms,
or mediums, certainly is available aesthetically. In artistic processing of a
picture in a different medium, what is at stake is the artist’s achievement.
Think of Jeff Koons’ String of Puppies (1988)—a sculptured rendering of a
black and white photograph of Art Rogers, Puppies (1985), of German Shep-
herd puppies in a string on the laps of a man and his wife sitting on a bench.
Comparing a photo of the sculpture to Art Rogers’ photo, one could not help
but notice how the two resemble each other—of course they do: Koons ex-
pressly made the sculpture after the photo. However, when one confronts the
two objects—the sculpture and the b/w photo—in perception, the differences
are massive. The same holds for the recent—Belgian—court case of photogra-
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pher, Katrijn Van Giel, v. painter, Luc Tuymans who made a painting after
a photo that Van Giel made of Belgian politician, Jean-Marie DeDecker after
his defeat in elections. After initially winning her case, Van Giel later settled
with Tuymans. I discuss this at length in another place, but summarise my
argument here.5 The judge made an aesthetic mistake when he held up two
photographic reproductions, one of the photo and one of the painting, asking
those present rhetorically what were the differences—suggesting he could not
see any. Van Giel’s picture was a photograph, published in the papers, of a
Belgian politician, the other a painting, in the typical style of Tuymans, of
the image in a photo (Van Giel’s). Of course, the images resembled one an-
other, but a real-life—thick—confrontation with either of the two, the photo
and the painting, would produce a vastly different phenomenology in the be-
holder, due to differences between a journalistic photo reporting a political
fact, and a painting symptomising a way of treating paint on a canvas.
a. Blue Period b. Mercurius, 2015
Figure 2: Rob Scholte
Image right is a right of the original image maker, based on their achieve-
ment, but what is included in that achievement? The maker may be able to
determine the image in full in an objective sense, but they cannot so control
the meaning that the image subsequently acquires. One wonders what good
is an image right that protects the making of an image, visible in the image’s
surface, but not the image’s meaning and its eventual significance? Surely,
it is the latter that turns an image into something worthy of protecting? We
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don’t go about protecting everything and anything someone makes. The cru-
cial bit making something worth protecting, it seems to me, is the realisation
in it of personal intentionality—as it shows in the result. I am thinking,
centrally, of a picture’s expressiveness or other aesthetic value.
Pastiche, a forgery made in the style of another artist, but not a straight-
forward copy of their work—like Han van Meegeren’s Supper at Emmaus, in
another painter’s, Johannes Vermeer’s style—we treat as a kind of forgery.
Rightly so, I think, albeit for different reasons than theft of originality. We
reject Van Meegeren’s pastiche because it spoiled something in the spectator-
ship; Supper at Emmaus profoundly confused the spectators’ appreciation of
all of Vermeer’s works. Van Meegeren’s crime consisted of signing the paint-
ing with “Vermeer”, and this was a crime, in my view, for aesthetic reasons
only.6
In practice, the judge will often be challenged greatly to sort out the intri-
cacies of a forgery case. Yet the biggest issue seems to be that the judge must
sometimes assume the role of an art critic, even though law is not equipped
for this, at all.7 The reason why in legal practice judges cannot always reach
the right verdict is due, I think, to the fact that law does not square with
the philosophy of art. It is the philosophy of the arts that explicates how the
relevant concepts of plagiarism, forgery, creativity, originality, image and art
are related reciprocally, hence my argument.
Figure 3: Rob Scholte, Utopia, 1986
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III. SEEING AS MANAGING MEANING
Rob Scholte views his works as recipes and has no problem in having these
executed by others. So his interest is not in realising his intentions through
the manipulation of materials by his own hands, but there is still a sense
of achievement in the nature of his recipes, as well as a conceptual consis-
tency amongst them. Also, once these works are finished, Scholte does not
claim that either he or his co-workers are the sole determinants of the works’
meanings. Though, in my view, Rob Scholte is clearly the one noticing the
artistic interest of his works. Who else is involved in the meaning of his
works, apart from the assistants in his workplace? Who determines a work’s
meaning? I am thinking of the art critics and other professionals interpreting
them, but also of any other suitable spectator.8 Surely, their interpretations
derive their justification from the meaning of the work. This meaning can be
assessed by everyone and anyone as long as they pay attention to the relevant
properties—and do it in a suitable manner.
In advertising, on the internet, and on television, we are bombarded with
images. How does this bombardment relate to image right? This question
interests Scholte, as much as myself. Should someone depicting something
or someone ask permission for doing so, or pay for it? Is this secondary
use, as well? Should people also compensate when all they do is look at
things and persons? Should they, likewise, ask for permission, or pay for
the privilege? Or better: Why not?9 Apparently, images are at the disposal
of people looking around. No, merely watching an image does not count as
a copyright infringement. I do not think that we should make it one. But
stranger things have happened.
The images of perception are thick—the spectator carries a responsibil-
ity towards the perceived, as does the perceived towards the spectator. In
perceptual presence to the stuff that we see—thickly—we are as much seen
by that stuff as see it.10 And in this reciprocity we grant each other the per-
mission to watch—or we don’t and then the other is supposed to avert their
eyes. This is regulated on a personal level—person-to-person. I cannot eas-
ily, if at all, observe another person in front of me, as we will gaze at each
other, address each other in our gazing. Observing a person objectifies them,
as feminists have rightly remarked. Pictures, instead, are thin. We could
make a photograph of someone and take it somewhere, and observe the per-
son then.11 Only this time, we are not looking at the person, are not even
observing them as the person they are, but are observing a snap shot taken
of them. Something, of which Wittgenstein once remarks:
We could easily imagine people who [. . . ], for example, would be
repelled by photographs, because a face without colour and even
perhaps a face reduced in scale would struck them as inhuman.”
(Wittgenstein 1953, 205:f).
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I would add that a photograph not only reduces scale and colour, but
also removes most sensuous access to the depicted reducing perception to
vision, as well as fixing something that is met in real-life as a reciprocal
process. Wittgenstein’s remark reminds me of the thought that pictures steal
an image, and rob it of its life, its processual nature. In the life of an image
of perception, the perceiver is present as a person, as a moral agent. So there
is no need to devise a law regulating viewing things or persons—we should
leave that to the people involved in a situation. The two-way responsivity
should prevent us from setting up a one-sided system of protective rules.12
But it does seem to tell us something about the law that we do have about
protecting pictures that people make.
Figure 4: Rob Scholte, Mondriaan Revisited
Image rights might be defended in cases where secondary use can be said
to involve abusing images—when the original images are used for some pur-
pose for which the carrier of the image, the person, the object or the situation,
were never intended. Of course, this is very complicated. I think it is defen-
sible for people to protest against such abuse, but such an ‘image right’ is
probably unenforceable, and the genie may already be out of the bottle.13
What could be wrong about turning the tables? Is my outward appearance
not in important measure possessed and guarded by all who see me?14 Then
the question becomes: What is the image in and of itself? i.e. irrespective
of any depiction or secondary use, and outside of the strictly legal context?
Is watching an image and recognising it as the image that it is, not precisely
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the way in which the image is possessed? Surely, an image gets its meaning
exactly in this experience?
Is it always a clear and shut case when someone makes a new image with
an old one, which of the two ought to be protected? Can the image right
be applied to protect the rights of a later maker, when they made something
of greater aesthetic value than the original maker did?15 Koons as well as
Rogers; Scholte as well as Philips; Tuymans as well as Van Giel. Secondary
users should not, of course, be granted the right to hold a claim against the
ones who made the first picture. But there might be room for a softened
application of the law. (In pop music the covers regularly are deemed better
than their originals). An argument for or against this possibility should be
based on aesthetic considerations—as, I argued, original image right already
is, however tacitly.
a. Glossy 17 b. Glossy 12
Figure 5: Rob Scholte
IV. WATCH DUTY
What the Coca-Cola Company wants, I guess, is for people everywhere in
the world to see their logo and immediately think of buying a bottle of it—
at least, that is what branding looks like from the part of the consumer. I
am not concerned here with the persuading force of the logo, or the buying;
I am concerned with the convincing, the rhetorical force of the image. A
logo is worth little if there are no people recognising it. The audience is as
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important for the image’s success as are its makers and legal owners. In legal
terms, we might want to formulate it as follows: the Coca-Cola Company
has the right—the image right—to require of all people that they recognise
their logo—a duty to watch and notice it. But give a little, take a little. One
cannot demand that everybody cooperate with Coca-Cola’s watch duty and
get nothing in return for their efforts. I wonder why the image right is set up
so one-sidedly? Why is there no viewers’ right answering the duty to watch,
since this duty is the image right’s very premise?16
Once one thinks about this seriously, one realises that the image-consumer
is better served with an anti-image right, a right to be safeguarded from
images—but, again, such a prohibition would be hard to maintain. The only
way to ward off a duty to watch is by looking the other way, but then the
image is already seen, is it not? Would that be the sole reason why we do not
have such a law: that perception is free as well as free-floating—like an idea?
I think image right is understood only halfway: the owner of the image
manoeuvers other people by demanding that they watch the image only in
the manner desired by the maker or their legal representative. But viewers
are never credited for the fact that they are so decent as to maintain and
endorse these images in this way.
The situation is similar in the media where so-called celebrities pop up
at regular intervals; so much so, that it is sometimes impossible to turn on
your television and not be confronted with yet another one of them: people
with little more interest than the fact that they are on television. The mere
occurrence of these images forms a doing, an action to be judged morally.
I am not arguing against pictures—I believe. But I do want to reverse
the standard priorities in ethics and law with regard to them. The maker
comes up with the image—and, agreed, this is of great value, when done
well. Otherwise it means little or nothing—think of the thousands of pictures
people make every day nowadays without a second’s thought. But it is a
picture’s spectators who steward it. One person’s image right is the other
person’s watch duty, and this is a breach of everyone’s autonomous, moral
dedication to perception. The freedom to perceive is so self-evident that we
did not even write a law to protect it. Let us water down some laws that are






1. The term of forgery makes little sense
in science: repeating another’s insight in
their words, saying that it is their insight—
that is called quoting. A simple attribu-
tory footnote suffices to prevent your own
writing from being taken as plagiarism. I
realise that this situation is rapidly chang-
ing, due to the large amounts of money
to be earned by keeping your invention
to yourself. Other than awaiting infringe-
ment, and our retrospect protest against
it, we rather patent our research, so as
to allow us to milk subsequent use of it
whether by scientists or in society at large.
2. I am, of course, referring to a famous fic-
tion story, by Jorge Luis Borges, ‘Pierre
Menard, author of the Quixote’, not a real
event. And see the next note.
3. See ‘Reanimation and Copyright. Rob
Scholte’s Work. Part II.’ Aesthetic Inves-
tigations, 2016:2.
4. Sherri Irvin 2005 argues that appropria-
tionists do not so much undermine a core
assumption in our concept of art that
a work’s meaning depends on the origi-
nal artist’s intentions: the appropriations
merely add an intended meaning to those
original ones. In this, they differ from forg-
eries, which expressly hide these added in-
tentions. Needless to add that the mean-
ing that appropriationists add to the orig-
inal one’s is rather shallow. They seem
to be making a philosophical point mostly,
and would fit Danto’s mistaken view that
art has become philosophy.
5. See van Gerwen 2015.
6. Alfred Lessing 1965 is mistaken about
forgery: he thinks that as long as we
cannot see the difference with the naked
eye, there is no aesthetic difference be-
tween two identical canvasses, and that,
therefore aesthetics cannot explain what
is wrong with forgery. I am not saying
Supper at Emmaus is a forgery of an orig-
inal Vermeer—it was a pastiche. I merely
point out that it is exactly aesthetics that
explains Van Meegeren’s misdoing.
7. See van Gerwen 2015, in Dutch.
8. Wollheim 2001, 13: ‘A suitable spectator is
a spectator who is suitably sensitive, suit-
ably informed, and, if necessary, suitably
prompted.’
9. This may sound like silly questions, like
asking people to pay for breathing—but
are they? On the internet, big players
like Google earn money whenever someone
reads something, but the writers hardly
ever get payed for it. If we could quan-
tify watching we might be able to turn
tourism into an industry that would ben-
efit all. Check Lanier 2014 for suggesting
something similar about the bits and bytes
exchanged on the internet.
10. See Elkins 1997.
11. Though, if the other were in the know
about the aim with which the photo is
taken, then, taking the photo would be in-
trusive as well.
12. Obviously, I am not proposing a decency
police, as whatever goes by that name, de-
cency, is an aspect of thick perception, and
is, hence, a thing for reciprocal adjustment
amongst people.
13. On the internet, abused images lead their
own lives, unstoppable at that.
14. This suggestion, also, has consequences for
the thought that each one of us is sovereign
in determining whether or not to apply
cosmetic surgery to their face. In Gerwen
2011 I argue that this right is misunder-
stood and is grounded in property right,
but that we do not possess our outward
looks in the same manner as a book or car.
15. More on this question in Rob Scholte’s
Work. Part II, this journal 2016:1
16. With art, things stand differently, though:
If one sees the Supper at Emmaus as a Ver-
meer, one appreciates it in light of Ver-
meer’s oeuvre, viewing it in a less fruitful
manner than if one were to see it as within
the oeuvre of Van Meegeren, a smart and
capable man, but not a great artist. What
is lost if one views it as a Vermeer is best
explained in Wollheim 1993. I am merely
pointing out that, I submit, the core of the
aesthetic appreciation of art is the search
for a way to perceive the maker in the
work.18 And this search can be hindered
by a forgery, but need not be hindered by
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a later work redoing an original, as in the
cases discussed here.
17. This text on Rob Scholte’s work, and the
one to appear in the next issue of Aesthetic
Investigations, are based on van Gerwen
2016. Pictures reproduced with the gener-
ous permission of the artist.
18. I am not arguing this view, here, though,
as it would require more space.
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